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I. INTRODUCTION
DUE to the lucrative prospect of finding oil and gas, mineral es-tates are deeply fractionalized among multiple owners. The mul-tiplicity of owners creates barriers of inefficiencies for oil and gas
development and thus hinders Texas’s industry.1 The problem is aggra-
vated by the common issue of dormant interests where interest owners
cannot be found.2 Without a doubt, much scholarship has been written to
remedy these industry-wide plagues. However, at root, Texas’s issue does
not concern the multiplicity of owners or dormant mineral interest.3
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2020; B.A., Government, Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin, 2016. With special thanks to Professor Coleman for introducing
me to the basic principles of oil and gas.
1. See Ernest E. Smith, Methods for Facilitating the Development of Oil and Gas
Lands Burdened with Outstanding Mineral Interests, 43 TEX. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (1964).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 131. Texas has adopted the majority view that cotenant mineral interest hold-
ers may drill without the consent of others. Those owners who withhold consent will here-
inafter be referred to as nonconsenting owners.
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Rather, the main barrier to oil and gas development is paying net profits
to nonconsenting cotenants by virtue of accounting.4 In Texas, even when
there is a multiplicity of owners or owners cannot be found, development
by cotenants is possible, so long as proper accounting is made to noncon-
senting cotenants. Thus, where the nonconsenting owners have large frac-
tional interests, their claim to net profits will proportionally reflect the
same. This causes two possible negative consequences: (1) the cotenant
seeking development must bear the burden and receive a lower royalty
from the oil and gas producer to secure a lease; or (2) the producer must
bear the burden and see its margins decrease to secure the lease from the
consenting cotenants. In either situation, the producer or consenting co-
tenant will be burdened and disincentivized to develop the mineral estate,
thus hindering Texas’s industry.
This comment will discuss this issue and possible solutions for Texas
cotenants seeking to develop their minerals. Part II will explain the legal
background of accounting in mineral development and expose how states
often limit personal property rights to facilitate oil and gas development.
In light of Part II, Part III will propose a drastic change to personal prop-
erty rights to eliminate net profit payments in Texas. Part IV will discuss
less drastic alternatives that may mitigate net profit payments that require
only minor extensions of preexisting law. Part V will conclude with a
summary of Texas’s options to avoid net profit payments and a long-term
speculation on where Texas law is heading.
II. BACKGROUND: WHY NET PROFITS?
Cotenancy is created when multiple people concurrently own a piece of
real property.5 Because each person is a concurrent owner, each cotenant
has a right to use the property.6 Moreover, perhaps contrary to intuition,
cotenants do not owe fiduciary duties to one another and may not act for
one another without permission.7 However, there are some implied du-
ties that arise in a cotenancy. For example, cotenants in actual use of the
property are liable to the non-user cotenants for any waste committed
and losses resulting therefrom.
In Texas, cotenants are required to share income and expenses from
the jointly owned property according to each tenant’s proportional inter-
est in the property.8 Moreover, it is permissible to deduct the expenses
4. Id. at 131–32. There is ambiguity regarding what expenses may be properly de-
ducted, which further causes barriers to oil and gas development. However, this comment
will not touch greatly on this topic.
5. Caleb A. Fielder, Esq., Blood and Oil: Exploring Possible Remedies to Mineral
Cotenancy Disputes in Texas, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV. 173, 176 (2017).
6. See id.
7. See id. While a cotenancy may appear to create an implied partnership among the
parties, this is not so.
8. See I-10 Colony, Inc. v. Chao Kuan Lee, 393 S.W.3d 467, 478–79 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (citing Williams v. Shamburger, 638 S.W.3d 639,
640 (Tex. App.—Waco 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
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from the income.9 Particularly, within the context of oil and gas leases,
these same rules generally apply; thus, nonconsenting owners are paid
their proportional income accrued by the property development minus
proportional expenses.10 Interestingly enough, the courts make an excep-
tion to favor nonconsenting cotenants. Rather than strictly applying the
general rules, Texas courts do not require nonconsenting owners to bur-
den their proportional expenses if they result from “money speculatively
spent” and the expenses cannot be deducted from the share of actual
production.11 Thus, the cotenancy rules of accounting in oil and gas fur-
ther pose a barrier to development because the producer or consenting
cotenant cannot seek reimbursement for expenses from, for example,
drilling dry-hole wells.12
As explained above, it is often the case that settled property law con-
flicts with the policy goal of promoting industry and efficiency. Account-
ing among cotenants is no different. In the next sections, this part will
analyze the moving force behind property law and how settled personal
property is often undermined and changed to further economic goals. In
turn, this part will hopefully sanitize the idea of changing, modifying, or
abridging Texas cotenancy law for the sake of promoting mineral
development.
A. THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY
Emerging from the late nineteenth century, property has been com-
monly classified as a bundle of legal “sticks.”13 That is, owning property is
an entitlement to a bundle of legal rights and privileges.14 Among the
most basic legal rights in property ownership are the rights to possess,
use, transfer, and exclude nonowners.15 It is important to note the mod-
ern American conception of property developed through the era of capi-
talism in the twentieth century.16 It appears the current state of property
law is a response to the increasingly complex forms of wealth, the desire
to promote economic growth, and the desire to better regulate diverse
property ownership.17
As property law developed in the twentieth century, it became increas-
ingly clear to legal realists that property ownership is not grounded in
natural law or supernatural rights.18 Rather, it was the legal sovereign—
9. See id. at 479.
10. See Neeley v. Intercity Mgmt. Corp., 732 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 1987, no writ) (citing Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Tex. 1965)).
11. See id. (citing Shaw & Estes v. Tex. Consol. Oils, 299 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App.—
Galveston 1957, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
12. See id.
13. See Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV.
869, 877 (2013).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 879.
16. See id. at 878.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 883–84.
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the state—which granted and secured these rights to private property
owners.19 Moreover, property rights became increasingly thought of as
relational; that is, owners did not have rights to objects but had rights
with or against other individuals.20
The relational nature of property law implied property rights are natu-
rally shared among individuals.21 For example, early scholars have de-
scribed property rights as merely one’s right to use and another’s
correlative duty or obligation to not use.22 However, this concept of
“sharing” property rights can be better explained in another way. Right
to property not only entails rights and corresponding obligations, but it
also entails correlative rights shared by all people within a legal commu-
nity with preferential rights given to the “property owner.”23 Insofar as
property rights are relational and correlative, property rights are condi-
tional and “property ownership” can easily change among those who
share the correlative rights.24 For example, property ownership is recog-
nized to the extent the owner is reasonably using the object. Once unrea-
sonable use is exhibited, the property owner’s rights are forfeited,
lessened, or made subservient to another’s claims to the property.25
Moreover, that property law exists by virtue of the sovereign’s will sug-
gests an interesting view of the nature of property law. It suggests prop-
erty law is mutable as much as the sovereign’s will is mutable. Thus,
insofar as the sovereign reflects a community’s standard of relationship,
or rather a code of conduct between individuals, then property law natu-
rally reflects such relationships.26 As the nature of relationships change,
defined property rights will also change under the sovereign’s watch.27
The Supreme Court of the United States partially echoed this idea of
property. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, the Court
explained that a public taking is not the mere denial of property use.28
The Court ultimately took a holistic view when analyzing property rights
and implicitly found correlative rights were the basis of public takings.
That is, the community also had a property interest in the publicly taken
19. See id.
20. See id. at 880.
21. See id. at 880–82.
22. See id.
23. See id. While the early scholars of the twentieth century did not find this character-
istic of property law evident, it is becoming increasingly articulated by modern scholars
who are advocating to modify the bundle of sticks concept of property law. See id. at 889.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 884. What comes to mind is the common practice of civil forfeiture and
public takings. Civil forfeiture is the practice by which the sovereign body seizes assets
involved in illegal activity and thus implicitly declares the property owner has forfeited his
right to the asset. The property is thereby placed under the community’s ownership accord-
ing to its correlative rights. See Stephen Schneider, Civil Forfeiture, ENCYCLOP DIA
BRITANNICA (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.britannica.com/topic/civil-forfeiture [https://per
ma.cc/74F2-8ACW].
26. See di Robilant, supra note 13, at 880–82.
27. See id.
28. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978); di Robi-
lant, supra note 13, at 888.
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object. Thus, it appears the conceptual framework of property law out-
lined earlier is the moving force of modern property law. As relationships
and policy goals change, it is obligatory that property law should also
change. The same should hold when considering changes to cotenancy
accounting rules. The next section of this part will provide examples of
legislatures and courts abridging property rights to facilitate oil and gas
development.
B. HISTORY OF FRICTION WITH OIL AND GAS POLICY GOALS
States have a history of abridging property rights so as to accomplish
their policy goals—especially to promote the oil and gas industry. For
example, states have increasingly adopted dormant mineral acts where
severed mineral estates would revert to the surface owner if the mineral
interests are not “used” for a period of time.29 In Texaco, Inc. v. Short,
the Supreme Court of the United States took up the issue whether such
dormant mineral acts were unconstitutional takings.30 The Court ulti-
mately upheld the state’s statute, finding the state did not take any prop-
erty, but rather, the state was merely statutorily defining abandonment.31
While the Court strained to make clear that the case was not about “de-
struction of a right,” the Court recognized dormant mineral acts were
“extinguishing” rights and withdrawing remedies.32 More importantly,
the Court focused on the enacting state’s legitimate goal to develop the
mineral estate.33 In summary, the Court stated, “The State surely has the
power to condition the ownership of property on compliance with condi-
tions that impose such a slight burden on the owner while providing such
clear benefits to the State.”34
Moreover, states, including Texas, have adopted certain rules of oil and
gas production that invariably limit property rights. For example, the
widespread adoption of the rule of capture.35 In a groundwater case, the
Texas Supreme Court adopted the rule of capture whereby landowners
are not liable for taking minerals on their own land though the minerals
initially belonged to an adjacent owner.36 In this landmark opinion, how-
29. Terrell Fenner, A Problem Lurking Just Below the Surface: The Need in Texas for
Dormant Mineral Legislation, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 501, 504–05 (2015).
30. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 522–23 (1982).
31. See id. at 529–30.
32. See id. at 528.
33. See id. at 529–30.
34. See id.
35. Eric Opiela, The Rule of Capture in Texas: An Outdated Principle Beyond Its Time,
6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 87, 103 (2002). Texas initially adopted the rule of capture as a
matter of water law, but Texas soon adopted it for application in oil and gas production.
See id. at 89.
36. Hous. & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 281–82 (1904). But for the rule of
capture, the common law principle cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos
would apply in its entirety. See Opiela, supra note 35, at 90. The principle roughly trans-
lates as “to whomever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths.” See id.
Thus, under this principle, a landowner would be liable for trespass or conversion in prop-
erty law, if minerals were taken from adjacent lands. See id. at 90–91.
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ever, the court did not discuss the rule of capture in terms of property law
or qualified ownership. Rather, it discussed the doctrine in terms of tort
non-liability.37 Nonetheless, the court intended its ruling to limit actions
regarding property to promote industry, agriculture, and utility.38
It was not until later that the court refined the rule of capture and
squarely spoke of the doctrine in terms of property ownership.39 Further-
more, the lower Texas courts followed suit and likewise recognized the
rule of capture as a property law doctrine.40 While there is debate
whether the more recent Texas Supreme Court cases have turned the rule
of capture doctrine into one of tort law, it remains clear that the rule of
capture may very well be a property law doctrine.41
The acceptance of the rule of capture illustrates that property law is a
malleable field of law meant to reflect the changing relationships between
individuals with each other and individuals with the state.42 The rule of
capture was a modification—a large exception—to the common law prin-
ciple cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos.43 However,
within Texas jurisprudence, it appears the exception has become the gen-
eral rule in the context of mineral development.44 The fact that the rule
of capture is limited by showing malice or waste indicates the rule is com-
plex, is deserving of its own jurisprudence, and has replaced the common
law rule of mineral ownership.45 It is an indication that property law dra-
matically changes according to changing societal standards.
Furthermore, it is important to note the development of the rule of
capture contains hints of equity.46 When the rule of capture is limited by
showings of malice or waste, the rule reflects fundamental presumptions
of property law articulated earlier in this comment.47 That is, ownership
in mineral property is not absolute, and the coextensive rights of others
and the community in the property must be taken into account. To make
clear, when the rule of capture declares non-liability for taking ownership
over minerals that otherwise would be improper under common law prin-
ciples, the rule is recognizing a landowner’s right to property. However,
when the rule makes exceptions to a landowner’s right to minerals if
37. See Opiela, supra note 35, at 95.
38. See id. at 96 (citing East, 81 S.W. at 280–81).
39. See id. at 96–97 (citing Tex. Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (Tex. 1927)) (arguing
that the court’s discussion of exclusive property rights and citations to certain cases indi-
cates the court’s view of the rule of capture as a matter of property law).
40. See id. (citing Pecos County Water Ctrl. & Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d
503, 505 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e)). In a more explicit fashion, the appel-
late court described the rule of capture and called it a “concept of property ownership.”
See Williams, 271 S.W.2d at 505.
41. See Opiela, supra note 35, at 100–01 (comparing Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-
Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978), with Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am.,
Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999)).
42. See id. at 101–02.
43. See id. at 90.
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waste or malice was committed, the rule will refuse to prioritize the land-
owner’s property rights but will recognize another’s claim to the miner-
als.48 As it stands, it appears the rule of capture represents a departure
from the presumption that owners have absolute ownership over their
minerals to the presumption that minerals are coextensively owned, in
different degrees, by the mineral estate owner, adjacent landowners, and
the sovereign at large.49
All this to say, within the context of mineral ownership, property law is
more about reflecting the relationships between community members
and equities than about absolute ownership. Thus, it should not be star-
tling that other facets of mineral ownership should be subject to change
so as to better reflect community standards and interests. In particular,
cotenancy accounting rules should be analyzed with this in mind and
changed to facilitate mineral development.
III. A PROPOSAL: RISK PENALTIES
Considering the flexibility of property law in the oil and gas context,
outright changing the accounting rules towards nonconsenting cotenants
is a solution. Namely, a sort of risk penalty should be imposed on net
profits.50 An example of a statutorily defined risk penalty can be found in
Texas’s Mineral Interest Pooling Act.51 Under this Act, a mineral interest
owner who is forced to pool and demands net profits may be charged a
risk penalty not exceeding 100% of the production costs.52 Another ex-
ample can be found in Ohio’s compulsory pooling statute.53 In that act,
the nonconsenting landowner who is forced to pool may suffer a 200%
risk penalty.54
Changing accounting rules can also be viewed as a proposal to expand
compulsory pooling acts to include any fractionalized mineral estate
where one cotenant is attempting to develop the minerals. The hope, at
least, is that the risk penalties will sufficiently mitigate the burden that
the producer or cotenant will suffer and thus facilitate mineral develop-
ment. However, even if risk penalties of 100% or 200% of production
costs are implemented, doubt exists whether this may be a sufficient bur-
den-relieving solution. For one matter, the production costs are generally
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Abby Harder, Compulsory Pooling Laws: Protecting the Conflicting Rights of
Neighboring Landowners, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.ncsl
.org/research/energy/compulsory-pooling-laws-protecting-the-conflicting-rights-of-neigh
boring-landowners.aspx [https://perma.cc/76JD-XNNZ]. The risk penalty regime is meant
to encourage production and discourage nonconsenting tenants from being hold outs. See
id. Traditionally, the risk penalty is suffered only when production is successful. See id.
51. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.052 (West 2018). The Mineral Interest Pool-
ing Act is meant to encourage voluntary pooling among mineral owners who do not have
enough land to fulfill a drilling unit.
52. See id.
53. See Lucas P. Baker, Forced into Fracking: Mandatory Pooling in Ohio, 42 CAP.
U.L. REV. 215, 217 (2014) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (West Supp. 2013)).
54. See id.
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fixed amounts.55 Thus, when risk penalties are calculated, the penalty will
only be effective until those production costs or a percentage thereof are
covered. This imposes a great limitation on risk penalties for the purpose
of facilitating mineral development. Since the proposed risk penalty will
only affect initial production costs, the penalty does not affect costs there-
after and thus eats into the long-term profits cotenants or producers are
attempting to secure.
This limitation is particularly aggravated by the terms of many leases
which anticipate long-term production. What comes to mind is the com-
mon secondary clause which provides that the lease will remain in effect
“as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from the leased premises or
operations.”56 With such a clause, a potential mineral development will
entail fixed production costs with long-term revenue.57 Thus, while a risk
penalty will mitigate paying high net profits to nonconsenting cotenants
initially, it will not mitigate the high payouts long term, which is where
the lease derives much of its value.58
A proposal to impose a risk penalty should not be limited to a percent-
age of production costs. Rather, a more appropriate risk penalty includes
imposing a percentage of production and post-production costs, imposing
a penalty which effectively imitates a lease royalty if the nonconsenting
cotenant enters into a lease, or requiring the nonconsenting cotenant to
enter into a lease.59 These types of penalties better consider the long-
term revenue that may be lost to a calculation of net profits. For example,
if a risk penalty is also based on post-production costs, then net profits
will be burdened by all costs incurred throughout the duration of a
lease.60 If the risk penalty requires the nonconsenting cotenant to enter
into the lease or imposes penalties that imitate the royalty clause of the
lease, then paying net profits will effectively be avoided.61 While these
55. See 55 TEX. JUR. 3D OIL & GAS § 351 (2018) (first citing Blackmon v. XTO En-
ergy, 276 S.W.3d 600 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, no pet.); then citing Cartwright v. Cologne
Prod. Co., 182 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied)). In Texas, pro-
duction costs are expenses “incurred in exploring for mineral substances and in bringing
them to the surface.” See Cartwright, 182 S.W.3d at 444. Unless changed by the lease terms,
these costs are generally burdened by the producer, and any “post-production costs” are
burdened proportionately by the producer and mineral estate owner. See id. Post-produc-
tion costs, for example, include the following: “[T]axes, treatment costs to render the gas
marketable, compression costs to make it deliverable into a purchaser’s pipeline, and trans-
portation costs.” See id. at 444–45.
56. See John McFarland, The Oil and Gas Lease—Part II: The Primary Term, OIL &




59. See Harder, supra note 50. Forcing nonconsenting cotenants into a lease is not
commonly found alone in compulsory pooling statutes. See id. Rather, forced leasing is
usually part of an “options” statute where the nonconsenting cotenants may elect their
form of payment if forced pooled. See id. Moreover, this sort of “penalty” is not typically
referred to as a risk penalty but, nonetheless, operates as a penalty in some sense. See id.
60. See Cartwright, 182 S.W.3d at 444–46; McFarland, supra note 56.
61. See Neeley v. Intercity Mgmt. Corp., 732 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 1987, no writ).
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sorts of risk penalties may be an adequate solution to tenants refusing to
enter into a lease with their cotenants, there may be constitutional issues
that must first be overcome before implementing these solutions.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS
As with most legal proposals that entail government involvement, the
imposition of risk penalties is subject to constitutional attack. However,
these attacks are not insurmountable. Since the proposals suggested
above require the Texas government to impose penalties and burden
property, constitutional questions necessarily arise. Moreover, since these
proposals are similar to compulsory pooling statutes, which have raised
and overcome constitutional attack, it is likely imposing risk penalties will
experience the same fate.62
Among the first questions usually hurled at compulsory pooling, and
likely against the proposed risk penalties, is whether due process is ful-
filled.63 Under United States Supreme Court precedent, the government
must provide “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.”64 While the Court’s in-
terpretation of due process does not require actual notice,65 there is de-
bate as to what due process necessarily requires.66 However, circuit
courts have found forced pooling orders indeed comply with due pro-
cess.67 Since imposing risk penalties would be akin to forced pooling stat-
utes, it is likely the proposed risk penalties can satisfy due process.
Another constitutional question that may arise is whether the state
government is overstepping its police powers when it imposes a risk pen-
alty on nonconsenting cotenants. While Texas courts have not directly
adjudicated the constitutionality of forced pooling statutes, other state
courts have.68 An overview of these cases sheds light on whether it is a
permissible use of a state’s police powers to impose risk penalties upon
nonconsenting cotenants who need not be pooled.69
62. See Bruce M. Kramer, Common Problems Attendant to Compulsory Pooling, 27
ENERGY & MIN. L. FOUND. § 7.03 (2006).
63. See id. Under compulsory pooling statutes, and as would be the case in the pro-
posed risk penalties, a state regulatory body is empowered to issue orders to compel pool-
ing and authorize mineral production. See id. To compel pooling, the regulatory body must
provide adequate notice. See id.
64. See id. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
65. See id.; Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 170 (2002) (“We note that none
of our cases cited by either party has required actual notice in proceedings such as this.”).
66. See Kramer, supra note 62 (citing Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223–26 (2006)).
67. See id. (citing Katter v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 765 F.2d 730, 732–35 (8th Cir. 1985))
(noting that the Eighth Circuit upheld a forced pooling order where the agency mailed a
notice of the hearing to the last known address of the nonconsenting mineral owner).
68. See Patrick Henry, Unleased and Unjoined Owners—Forced Pooling and Coten-
ancy Issues, 56 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 18.01 (2010) (noting courts in Oklahoma and
Utah have made adjudications whether the local government may appropriately impose
penalties or force cotenants to surrender their interests).
69. See id.
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Bennion v. ANR Production Co. was a case of first impression in the
Utah Supreme Court concerning whether imposing risk penalties on non-
consenting mineral interest owners is permissible under forced pooling
acts.70 As a preliminary matter, the court found that the penalties were
“entirely consistent” with protecting correlative rights, implementing a
reasonable way to allocate and compensate risk, providing each mineral
interest holder their fair share of minerals without waste, and promoting
oil and gas recovery.71
On the matter of unconstitutional takings, the Bennion court consid-
ered whether imposing a penalty was “unconstitutional on its face and as
applied because it [was] a taking of a property right without just compen-
sation.”72 Ultimately, the court found this argument lacking because tak-
ing a vested property right is substantively different than imposing an
obligation to pay a share of drilling costs.73 Furthermore, the court elabo-
rated that “[a]ny right he has to a statutory share of production . . . [is]
subject to the payment of a share of costs and expenses, including a share
of risk compensation . . . .”74
The court’s decision to uphold penalties relied in part on protecting
correlative rights.75 Namely, the party being forced to pool had the right
to burden costs of drilling or the right not to burden such costs.76 How-
ever, since not burdening the cost would be at the working interest own-
ers’ expense, the penalty would operate to rectify this inequitable
situation and thus protect correlative rights.77
Since the state is protecting correlative rights, the court reasoned the
risk penalty was a valid exercise of its police powers.78 Moreover, the
court found the police power was justified since the nonconsenting party
received a royalty from production and initially had an opportunity to
participate in the drilling costs without suffering a risk penalty.79 Further-
more, the court noted that protecting correlative rights, preventing waste,
and “fairly distributing among them the costs of production and of the
70. See Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343, 344, 346 (Utah 1991). The statute
dictates a penalty range of 150% to 200% of production costs. See id. at 349.
71. See id. at 346–47. These objectives were outlined in Utah’s forced pooling statute
and required compliance. Id.




76. See id. In the usual situation of forced pooling, the nonconsenting mineral interest
owner becomes a cotenant to the producer who leased the mineral estate from the other
pooled tracts. See id. As a nonconsenting cotenant to production, the cotenant may fully
cooperate with the producer and burden a share of operating costs, or receive net profits
where costs are only suffered, if revenue is secured. See id.
77. See id. (citing Anderson v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 327 P.2d 699, 703 (Okla. 1957))
(noting the Utah statute recognized correlative rights); In re SAM OIL, Inc., 817 P.2d 299,
302 (Utah 1991) (describing the protection of correlative rights as promoting mutual bene-
fits, protecting the public good generally, and ensuring “nonparticipating owners do not
benefit from the successful outcome of risks they do not take”).
78. See SAM OIL, 817 P.2d at 348–49.
79. See id. at 348.
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apportionment” were valid state interests that are furthered in a forced
pooling statute.80
In Anderson v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, a forced pool-
ing statute was invoked against a nonconsenting mineral interest owner.81
The penalty in question involved forcing the nonconsenting owner to par-
ticipate in drilling costs or surrender his interest for an $800 per acre bo-
nus and leasehold.82 Among the many protests issued by the
nonconsenting owner, he contended the imposed penalty constituted an
unconstitutional taking for private use and a due process violation.83
The Oklahoma Supreme Court ultimately upheld the penalties as con-
stitutional.84 As a preliminary matter, the court was sure to lay down the
fundamental principles that would guide its reasoning:
All property is held subject to the valid exercise of the police power;
nor are regulations unconstitutional merely because they operate as
a restraint upon private rights of person or property or will result in
loss to individuals. The infliction of such loss is not a deprivation of
property without due process of law; the exertion of police power
upon subjects lying within its scope, in a proper and lawful manner,
is due process of law.85
The Oklahoma court elaborated on Texas Supreme Court precedent by
deciding a forced pooling statute is not a taking because the government
granted the nonconsenting owner a right to participate in production with
conditions or receive a bonus.86 Moreover, the forced pooling order did
not constitute a taking because the producer was granted permission to
drill upon paying the nonconsenting interest owner.87
As a final matter in this overview of constitutional principles that may
affect the proposed risk penalties, it would be instructive to mention one
last Oklahoma Supreme Court case. In the much-cited Patterson v. Stano-
lind Oil & Gas Co., the court provided a deep analysis on the nature of
correlative rights that justify forced pooling statutes.88 In part, the opin-
ion quoted the following from Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana:
But there is a coequal right in them all to take from a common
source of supply the two substances which in the nature of things are
united, though separate. It follows from the essence of their right and
80. See id. at 348–49 (citing Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 320 U.S. 222, 227 (1943)). This
line of reasoning was in response to a due process argument. See id. Due process was
fulfilled because Utah’s forced pooling statute reasonably related to a permissible state
interest. See id.
81. See Anderson, 327 P.2d at 700–01.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 701. The nonconsenting owner also contended the forced pooling statute
unconstitutionally compelled him to contract against his will and impaired his vested con-
tractual rights. See id.
84. See id. at 704.
85. See id. at 702 (quoting Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex.
1931)).
86. See id. at 702–03.
87. See id. at 703.
88. See Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83, 88 (Okla. 1938).
860 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72
from the situation of the things as to which it can be exerted, that the
use by one of his power to seek to convert a part of the common
fund to actual possession may result in an undue proportion being
attributed to one of the possessors of the right to the detriment of . . .
others, or by waste by one or more to the annihilation of the rights of
the remainder. Hence it is that the legislative power, from the pecu-
liar nature of the right and the objects upon which it is to be exerted,
can be manifested for the purpose of protecting all the collective
owners, by securing a just distribution, to arise from the enjoyment,
by them, of their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach the
like end by preventing waste.89
As the Patterson case implied, the constitutionality of forced pooling and
imposing penalties is generally not a matter of unconstitutional takings
but rather of protecting individuals and their correlative rights.90
Thus, it is likely that imposing risk penalties on nonconsenting coten-
ants will pass constitutional muster. The exposited jurisprudence relies
heavily on state interests and protecting correlative rights, which are pre-
sent factors if a state were to impose risk penalties on nonconsenting co-
tenants. The risk penalty proposal seeks to limit net profit payments in
order to prevent waste and promote mineral development.91 Further-
more, correlative rights are certainly at play since one cotenant is hin-
dered from securing his equitable share of minerals from the common
supply.92 That is, the nonconsenting cotenant is effectively barring or
making mineral development unreasonably difficult for cotenants seeking
mineral development. Furthermore, an unconstitutional taking would not
occur either. Courts stressed that taking a vested property right is differ-
ent than imposing conditions to participate in production.93 Likewise
here, the state is arguably granting the right to share in production with
the condition that net profits be limited so as to further reasonable state
interests. Thus, the proposal would merely be an appropriate exercise of
the state’s police powers.94
However, there are clear differences between constitutionally sanc-
tioned penalties within forced pooling statutes and the penalties proposed
here, which may affect the constitutional analysis. For example, forced
pooling statutes involve granting a mineral interest owner, fractional or
otherwise, an opportunity to produce minerals where a gas and oil regula-
tion would otherwise prohibit.95 Whereas, the situation to which this
comment is concerned does not involve regulatory prohibitions that ini-
89. See id. (quoting Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209–10 (1900)).
90. See id.
91. See Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343, 348–49 (Utah 1991).
92. See id. at 348.
93. See id. at 348–49.
94. See Anderson v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 327 P.2d 699, 702 (Okla. 1957).
95. See Porter Wright, Oil & Gas Terms. . . Confused? You Aren’t the Only One, OIL
& GAS LAW REP. (Nov. 19, 2012), https://www.oilandgaslawreport.com/2012/11/19/oil-gas-
terms-confused-you-arent-the-only-one/ [https://perma.cc/92SZ-Q4Q6]. State conservation
agencies commonly create “drilling units” to promote conservation efforts and correlative
rights. See id. A drilling unit is the minimum amount of acreage required to pursue mineral
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tially bar production. That is, the issue does not presume drilling units are
a barrier to production; rather, cotenants are. Furthermore, since coten-
ants are jointly and severally owners of property, they are already enti-
tled to the profits and accountable to costs incurred by the property.
Thus, the state cannot grant a right to production that cotenants already
have by virtue of the cotenancy and impose conditions on this right. This
is the fundamental difference between penalties imposed pursuant to
forced pooling and penalties imposed pursuant to a merely nonconsent-
ing cotenant. Since much of the jurisprudence outlined above relies on
the premise that forced pooling entails granting a right to production with
conditions, there is doubt whether the penalties proposed here do not
constitute a taking. However, a more nuanced understanding of coten-
ancy and a state’s police powers may suggest a taking is not occurring
after all.
For one, the state is providing a right to production akin to forced pool-
ing statutes, albeit through common law.96 The Texas Supreme Court has
reiterated its longtime rule that cotenants have the right to extract miner-
als from the property without securing consent of the other cotenants.97
Furthermore, the nonconsenting cotenant is owed their reasonable por-
tion of the value of minerals taken, less reasonable costs of production
and marketing.98 Through the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the common law, Texas ensured a nonconsenting cotenant’s right to their
share of production. This idea is likely bolstered by the fact that Texas
does not consider mineral development as actionable waste and, thus,
protects nonconsenting cotenants to participate against possible injunc-
tions by other nonconsenting cotenants.
Moreover, this sort of reasoning appears in line with the underlying
principles of property discussed earlier. Many modern legal thinkers be-
lieve property law is founded upon the sovereign’s will.99 It is the state,
and its use of its police powers, that creates property rights.100 Therefore,
a cotenant’s right to accounting is a grant of rights that may be condi-
tioned; thus, risk penalties on net profits would not constitute a taking—
at least where modifying methods of accounting do not fundamentally
alter an individual’s possessory interest in the property. Finally, especially
in Texas, it is more likely the case that cotenancy accounting rights are
derived from the state and thus may have conditions placed upon them
due to precedent. For example, in Lombardo v. City of Dallas, the Texas
Supreme Court cogently described the nature of property in this way:
“All property is held subject to the valid exercise of the police power; nor
are regulations unconstitutional merely because they operate as a re-
production. See id. Thus, if a mineral interest owner has less than the required acreage to
produce, the owner must pool in order to pursue production on their land. See id.
96. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 426 (Tex. 2008).
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See di Robilant, supra note 13, at 883–84.
100. See id.
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straint upon private rights of person or property or will result in loss to
individuals.”101 Thus, per Lombardo, while imposing risk penalties is a
“taking” of sorts, it nonetheless falls within the state’s police powers.
However, some may argue that the heavy reliance on state police
power to justify risk penalties goes too far. That is, if modernists are right
and their realist view is adopted, then the sovereign grants any and all
property rights. Thus, any regulation on property would be permissible
because regulations are merely conditions and could never constitute a
taking. Indeed, it would be reasonable to doubt the modernists when they
say the sovereign is the alpha and the omega. One should always be cau-
tious when their rationale denies some sort of natural or super-sovereign
law. To abide by the modernist view that all things come from the sover-
eign would necessarily entail eschewing an objective moral code by which
law should be based on.
While the heavy doctrinal reliance on the modernist view is worrisome,
it need not be the exclusive justification for imposing risk penalties on
nonconsenting cotenants. Rather, the modernist view can rightfully be
discarded and objective principles governing cotenancy can still be ac-
knowledged. Instead of justifying risk penalties on the sovereign’s all-en-
compassing power, penalties can be justified upon discoveries and
determinations of the natural law as applied to joint ownership. Thus, im-
posing risk penalties on net profits is still a doctrinally sound solution to
promoting mineral development.
Some may further argue the constitutionality of forced pooling statutes
involves different property rights than those involved in the proposed so-
lution. It may be argued that correlative rights, used in the narrower
sense common in oil and gas law, are not an issue when attempting to
impose risk penalties. As stated above, correlative rights within the oil
and gas context refer to ensuring mineral interest owners have a fair op-
portunity to secure their equitable share of minerals.102 Where drilling
units are not an issue and do not bar production, cotenants indeed have
an opportunity to secure value from their minerals; thus, correlative
rights are protected.103 That is, cotenants may begin production or may
lease to a producer, if they desire, without hindrance. Nonconsenting co-
tenants receiving net profits is not a prohibition on production, like a
drilling unit may pose, but rather a mere inconvenience.
Furthermore, correlative rights usually refer to those rights property
owners have against other owners who share a common source of miner-
als but occupy different tracts of land.104 Since cotenants own property
jointly and severally, then cotenants are more likely seen as a single entity
that owns the property.105 Since cotenants are not separate owners who
101. See Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. 1934).
102. See Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343, 348 (Utah 1991).
103. See id.
104. See Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83, 88 (Okla. 1938).
105. See I-10 Colony, Inc. v. Chao Kuan Lee, 393 S.W.3d 467, 478–79 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
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separately share a source of minerals, it is hard to imagine they have cor-
relative rights as to each other.
Despite these arguments, there is good reason to expand these notions
of correlative rights and justify risk penalties on net profits. Correlative
rights, in a broader sense, can refer to the relativity of property owner-
ship. That is, while certain individuals may have a primacy to property,
this does not exclude other individuals or entities from having a secon-
dary or contingent right that may still be enforced. The relativity of prop-
erty ownership is found in the law of nuisance and in civil forfeiture, as
mentioned earlier, and it is equally applicable in the context of mineral
development.106 Applying the principle to the circumstances, it appears
cotenants have correlative rights even against each other. While coten-
ants are seen as joint owners, they are still separate entities who have
correlative rights to ensure property is being used reasonably. Moreover,
while it is the community that defines correlative rights and what consti-
tutes reasonable use, it is reasonable to believe current accounting rules
hinder reasonable use of mineral estates and thus violate correlative
rights. There is reason to not limit correlative rights to only owners of
different tracts. Rather, imposing risk penalties on net profits would in-
deed protect correlative rights.
In sum, it appears imposing risk penalties on net profit payments will
pass constitutional muster and be a wise application of underlying prop-
erty law. The objective of risk penalties is to present the most effective
way to promote mineral development despite nonconsenting mineral
owners—simply change accounting rules. However, despite its simplicity,
the solution may prove more difficult to actually implement since Texas
lawmaking is reluctant to burden property rights. Nonetheless, there are
preexisting property and mineral law doctrines that could avoid net profit
payments and facilitate mineral development.
IV. OTHER POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
In light of the legal hurdles of implementing risk penalties on noncon-
senting cotenants, it would be wise to consider other solutions. Some so-
lutions may require a modification of Texas law allowing application to
nonconsenting cotenants. Other solutions may merely require fortuitous
circumstances. That is, the solution may already exist in law but is only
effective in limited circumstances. The solutions can be derived from the
following preexisting areas of Texas law: (a) dormant mineral acts;
(b) marketable title acts; (c) statutory prescriptions; (d) compulsory pool-
ing; (e) judicial partitions; and (f) receiverships.
A. DORMANT MINERAL ACTS
In general, dormant mineral acts are statutes meant to divest “dor-
mant” or unused mineral interests and vest them into the surface interest
106. See di Robilant, supra note 13, at 884.
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owner who sits on top of the minerals.107 Like many other legislative acts
that regard divestiture, these sorts of acts have been challenged as uncon-
stitutional.108 However, the Supreme Court of the United States has
found dormant mineral acts do not constitute an unconstitutional tak-
ing.109 Rather, the Court found such acts were justified on a state’s power
to “condition the permanent retention of that property right on the per-
formance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present intention to
retain the interest.”110 Since dormant mineral acts were merely statutory
definitions of abandonment, the acts were placing reasonable conditions
on permanent ownership and defining indicators of present intention to
retain ownerships.111
While Texas currently has not adopted a dormant mineral act, it is a
possible solution to avoid paying net profits.112 An aggressive dormant
mineral act that defines abandonment broadly, is self-executory, and
vests the mineral interest in a cotenant may prove very useful.113 While
many dormant mineral acts adopted by other states vest the mineral in-
terest into the surface owner, it does not appear to be an issue if it were
vested in the mineral cotenant.114 After all, cotenants are jointly and sev-
erally owners of an interest, and so it appears an abandoned interest will
naturally go to the other co-owners.
However, even with an aggressive dormant mineral act, there are in-
herent limitations that may prove inefficient in avoiding net profit pay-
ments. Since statutorily defined abandonment must be reasonable, long
periods of nonuse will likely be required before an interest is officially
declared dormant. This waiting period may be too burdensome and ulti-
mately fail to effectively facilitate oil and gas development. Yet, since rea-
sonableness is usually defined by the political community, a dormant
mineral act can be optimized to effectively avoid net profit payments.
Indeed, a dormant mineral act which pushes the limit on what is reasona-
ble may be enough to dramatically facilitate oil and gas development.
B. MARKETABLE TITLE ACTS
Similar to dormant mineral acts, marketable title acts are commonly
used to facilitate oil and gas transactions.115 While marketable title acts
do not extinguish mineral interests like dormant mineral acts, they
achieve similar results because they bar mineral interest claims if certain
conditions are met.116 For example, a Michigan statute made all marketa-
107. See Fenner, supra note 29, at 504.
108. See id. at 504–05.
109. See id. at 505.
110. See id. (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 526 (1982)).
111. See id. at 504–06.
112. See id. at 502.
113. See id. at 506 (discussing the Court’s finding in Texaco that a self-executory dor-
mant mineral act was not unconstitutional itself).
114. See id.
115. See Smith, supra note 1, at 151–52.
116. See id.
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ble titles “free and clear of any and all interests, claims and charges what-
soever the existence of which depends . . . upon any act, transaction,
event or omission that occurred” before the forty-year recording period
unless such claims or interests were recorded in that period.117 This type
of statute appears to impose a recurring obligation to record the mineral
interest every forty years or else the act bars the interest owner’s
claims.118
Thus, marketable title acts could have a role in facilitating development
among nonconsenting cotenants. If a cotenant leases the property, the
producing cotenant may withhold net profit payments, hoping the forty-
year recording period passes without the cotenant rerecording his inter-
est. When this occurs, the cotenant’s claim for net profits may be barred
by a marketable title act.
However, like the difficulties arising from dormant mineral acts, rely-
ing on marketable title acts to avoid net profit payment is risky. In the
scenario described above, the producing cotenant must wait forty years
before producing or else accept the risk of litigation. Moreover, common
marketable title acts have recording periods ranging from twenty to fifty
years.119 These periods may be too long and push away producers who
refuse the overhanging risk of litigation, hampering oil and gas develop-
ment. However, these limitations are not inherent in all marketable title
acts. Texas can adopt a marketable title act with a relatively short record-
ing period and economic solutions can be found for rising litigation costs,
such as insurance plans. Thus, a Texas marketable title act can be useful
in avoiding net profit payments.
C. STATUTORY PRESCRIPTION
Statutory prescription involves classifying what would otherwise be
mineral interests as simple servitudes on land.120 Thus, an individual owns
minerals insofar as she has a servitude. As adopted by Louisiana, the sys-
tem of servitudes is accompanied by the doctrine of liberative prescrip-
tion.121 The doctrine of liberative prescription in many ways achieves the
same results as dormant mineral acts: extinguishing servitudes upon non-
use during a prescriptive period.122 For example, failure to produce or
perform good faith drilling will not constitute a “use” and thus not toll
the prescriptive period.123 Upon expiration of the servitude, the rights are
returned to the surface estate owner.124
It is readily apparent how liberative prescription can facilitate oil and
gas development, despite nonconsenting cotenants. If the prescription is
117. See id. at 151 n.116.
118. See id. at 151–52.
119. See id. at 151.
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not used, as might be the case with dormant mineral interest cotenants,
then the interest will be lost. While in Louisiana the interest is typically
given to the surface estate owner, it may be possible to prefer the other
mineral interest cotenant.125 Moreover, the doctrine of liberative pre-
scription can be legislatively implemented so as to shorten the prescrip-
tion period.126
However, there are some obstacles with using this solution to facilitate
oil and gas development. As alluded to earlier, this solution would entail
abolishing Texas’s traditional classification that mineral ownership is
ownership in the fee itself, as opposed to an ownership of a servitude.
This would overthrow the extensive case law and legal reasoning predi-
cated upon mineral ownership being actual ownership.
Moreover, even if Texas were to overhaul its classification system,
liberative prescriptions will only mitigate dormant nonconsenting coten-
ants and the net profits that would be owed to them. While a shortened
prescriptive period may catch a negligent nonconsenting cotenant who is
not dormant, it is unlikely to catch enough to facilitate development as
hoped for. Since this Louisianan solution is based on nonuse, it is unlikely
to mitigate the problem that arises when cotenants actively withhold con-
sent and demand net profits. While unlikely to be a viable solution in
Texas to mitigate net profit payments, it is nonetheless a solution Texas
has at its disposal that may facilitate some mineral development.
D. COMPULSORY POOLING
Compulsory pooling as a solution in itself has yet to be considered but
may help avoid paying net profits. As mentioned above, Texas has
adopted a compulsory pooling statute to remedy the “small tract prob-
lem,” wherein mineral interest owners are able to produce despite not
fulfilling drilling unit regulations.127 To take advantage of this statute, a
mineral interest owner must provide a “fair and reasonable” offer to an
adjacent tract owner and the reservoirs desired to be produced must have
been discovered after March 8, 1961.128 If the offer is not taken, a mineral
owner may force pool, and the forced party may be subject to risk
penalties.129
While the Texas compulsory pooling act appears to have all the tools
necessary to mitigate net profit payments, it is severely limited since it
may only be applied in certain circumstances. At least as the Texas act is
125. See id.
126. See La. Petroleum Co. v. Broussard, 135 So. 1, 2 (La. 1931); Keebler v. Seubert,
120 So. 591, 592 (La. 1929). At the time of these cases, the legislature appeared to provide
a ten-year prescription period. Presumably, if this system of prescriptive mineral rights
were adopted in Texas, the local legislature may adopt similar—or shorter—prescriptive
periods, notwithstanding any local constitutional issues.
127. See generally Gina S. Warren, Pooling Clauses and Statutes, TEX. A&M L. SCHOL-
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concerned, only certain interests may be pooled and subject to risk penal-
ties. That is, the interest must cover reservoirs discovered after 1961. Fur-
thermore, forced pooling will only be permitted after a fair offer is given,
which can lead to litigation on what constitutes “fair and reasonable.”130
Furthermore, the Texas compulsory pooling act, and other similar acts
in general, are limited to forced pooling against adjacent tract owners.
This limitation immediately makes such pooling acts unhelpful when a
cotenant wants to develop despite a nonconsenting cotenant on the same
tract. However, there may be a unique circumstance where a cotenant
can utilize forced pooling to limit net profit payments. What is imagined
is a fractional mineral interest owner who desires to have the forced pool-
ing act used against them. If this occurs, the fractional owner may opt into
the lease so producers are not deterred by having to pay net profits, and
the other fractional owners’ net profit payments will be burdened by risk
penalties. Even if cotenants could use the forced pooling act against co-
tenants on the same tract, many compulsory pooling acts only provide
limited risk penalties. With this in mind, it appears the Texas compulsory
pooling act may not be useful in facilitating oil and gas production against
nonconsenting cotenants. However, the Texas legislature may modify the
current compulsory pooling act such that the risk penalties are more ef-
fective. With slight modification, compulsory pooling acts may be useful
in Texas.
E. JUDICIAL PARTITION
Perhaps the simplest preexisting solution to circumvent the noncon-
senting cotenant is to seek judicial partition.131 Partition is a remedy usu-
ally available to fractional interest owners and is only available in-kind or
by sale.132 That is, the property can be equitably distributed among the
owners either by actually dividing the property or by selling the property
and distributing the funds.133 While partition may be pursued voluntarily,
forced partition can be gained through judicial proceedings.134 In Texas,
partition in kind is preferred when concerning mineral estates.135 How-
ever, upon sufficient showing of inequity, a court may grant partition by
sale.136
130. See Carson v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 669 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. 1984) (holding an
offer was unreasonable when a forced party had already started production and the offer
would require the forced party to decrease his interest in production by about 66%).
131. See Smith, supra note 1, at 136–37.
132. See id. at 137–42.
133. See id.
134. See 55 TEX. JUR. 3D OIL & GAS § 57 (2018).
135. See id.
136. See id. While partition in kind is preferred, it is usually not the given remedy. See
Champion v. Robinson, 392 S.W.3d 118, 132 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. denied).
Texas courts presume minerals are equally distributed and thus prefer to grant partition in
kind. See id. at 125. However, as many reservoirs are not uniform, the presumption can
easily be overcome. See id. Thus, courts are likely to grant partition by sale, finding parti-
tion in kind may lead to inequitable distribution. See id.
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At first glance, it appears a forced partition in kind would be a suitable
way to secure a producer, extract value from the land, and facilitate the
oil and gas industry. However, given the unlikelihood of uniform mineral
estates, partition in kind is expected to be rare. Moreover, even if parti-
tion in kind can be achieved, a cotenant must have sufficient interest to
obtain a sufficient partition that could attract producers. If a cotenant has
a small mineral interest or is given a partition in a poor location,137 the
cotenant may be hard pressed to find a producer to lease or purchase the
property.
Furthermore, a partition by sale may also seem like a suitable solution.
After all, the entire mineral estate would be sold to the highest bidder,
the consenting cotenant can secure the property, or the once-cotenant
can secure value if another individual purchases the property. In turn, this
promotes alienation and facilitates the industry. However, a cotenant de-
siring to produce may loathe the idea of parting with their property as
opposed to merely leasing it and retaining ownership. Moreover, the de-
siring cotenant may rightly fear that outright selling the land would be
less profitable than leasing it for production. While a producer lessee may
think this is the simple solution to avoid net profits to nonconsenting co-
tenants, the consenting cotenants may think this is no solution at all due
to the monetary sacrifice they must make to secure production. Thus,
while expanding partition rules is a solution to avoid net profit payments
and facilitate mineral development, it has its limitations.
F. RECEIVERSHIP
Courts of equity are generally empowered to appoint receivers to re-
solve disputes between cotenants.138 These court-appointed receivers
could be a viable solution to facilitate production despite nonconsenting
cotenants. Generally, if a receiver is appointed, the receiver acts as the
undivided interest owner of the disputed property and is given authority
to lease the land in total.139 Thus, if the receiver is authorized to enter the
property into a lease, the original nonconsenting cotenant will not be
owed net profits.140
In Texas, a statute outlines a court’s authority to appoint a receiver.141
Generally, when there is an action between cotenants and the property is
in danger of injury, a cotenant may apply for a receivership.142 A classic
example of a court granting a receivership is United North & South Oil
Co. v. Meredith.143 In this Texas case regarding partition and the validity
137. A poor location is one that may be outside a drilling or spacing unit. Thus, a poten-
tial lessor may not desire that tract since it would require them to comply with drilling and
spacing regulations, and essentially make them suffer from the small tract problem.
138. See 55 TEX. JUR. 3D OIL AND GAS § 314 (2018).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.001 (West 2018).
142. See id.
143. See 272 S.W. 124, 124–25 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925).
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of a prior lease, the court appointed a receiver because the property was
in danger of drainage and a cotenant was impeding the necessary, imme-
diate plan to mitigate drainage.144 More specifically, since the litigation
caused the property interests to be in dispute while drainage was immi-
nent, the court found this was a sufficient impediment to justify a
receiver.145
While court-appointed receivers can be used to control the property for
the benefit of all the cotenants—and thereby facilitate oil and gas devel-
opment when beneficial to all parties—there are important limitations to
granting receiverships. Perhaps the clearest limitation is that receiver-
ships cannot be the sole remedy requested.146 “A receiver will not be
appointed except in a proceeding ancillary to some action for permanent
or other relief.”147 Thus, this rule prohibits a cotenant from seeking a
court-appointed receiver only because a cotenant is nonconsenting.
Rather, the cotenant desiring production must also seek, for example, ju-
dicial partition. This limitation is a great impediment in facilitating oil and
gas development, as receiverships can only be sought in very limited
circumstances.
Moreover, receiverships are generally only granted when the property
is in danger of substantial harm. This further imposes a limitation on us-
ing receiverships to facilitate development. While early Texas precedent
suggested no danger of property damage is necessary,148 the revised
Texas statute clarifies that such danger is a prerequisite.149 Thus, the ob-
stacles posed by a nonconsenting cotenant are not enough to constitute a
danger to the property. Rather, the danger of drainage of some sort must
be shown to obtain a receivership and to authorize leasing the
property.150
While receiverships as a preexisting remedy are a sufficient solution to
avoid net profit payments to nonconsenting cotenants, application restric-
tions pose a great obstacle as a viable solution to facilitating mineral de-
velopment. Not only is danger of property necessary to appoint a
receiver, but a receivership cannot stand alone as a remedy. This in-
troduces litigation costs that must be incurred simply to obtain a receiver-
ship and avoid net profit payments. Unless the Texas legislature attempts
144. See id. at 125–26.
145. See id. at 126.
146. See Staggs v. Pena, 133 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1939, no writ).
147. Id.
148. See Smith, supra note 1, at 143–44 (citing Gilles v. Yarbrough, 224 S.W.2d 720
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1949, no writ)). Gilles concerned a mineral estate with about 200
fractional owners. See Gilles, 224 S.W.2d at 720–21. After determining the parties’ mineral
interests, the trial court granted a receivership to lease the minerals as it otherwise would
be impossible to gain consent from all the cotenants. See id. at 720–22.
149. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.001(b) (West 2018). The new Texas
statute explicitly states that a party applying for a receivership must show “the property or
fund must be in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured.” Id.
150. See Smith, supra note 1, at 143–44.
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to grant courts more authority in their receivership-granting powers,151
receiverships are of little use to facilitate mineral production. However,
receiverships can currently be a solution, if the producing cotenant finds
himself in the right circumstance.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Texas has many solutions within its arsenal to help co-
tenants avoid paying net profits and thus facilitate oil and gas develop-
ment. Moreover, Texas lawmakers have the constitutional and property
law principles behind them if they were to overhaul its accounting system
and outright impose risk penalties on nonconsenting cotenants. While a
complete overhaul of the accounting system is a drastic measure, Texas
nonetheless has preexisting solutions which may require slight modifica-
tions. Though one should be doubtful for legislation that further encum-
bers property rights in Texas, one thing is for sure: the best way to
facilitate mineral development among jointly owned mineral estates is to
address the burdensome net profit payments nonconsenting cotenants are
owed.
151. What is imagined is the legislature permitting courts to grant receiverships as a
matter of equity. Thus, if a court were to find a cotenant’s nonconsent grossly unreasonable
and causing waste, then a court could more freely grant receiverships to use the property in
a more equitable manner.
